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Using a methodology  that allows for  The perceived  increases  in export competi-
endogenizing  decisions  to participate  in World  tiveness  and in the efficiency  of investment
Bank adjustment  lending programs,  and for  (stipposed  to be generated  by refonn programs)
testing the validity  of assumptions  about  pro-  has not been sufficient  to counterbalance  the
gram participation,  Elbadawi  studies  the effec-  ensuing  decline  in investment  and hence to
tiveness  of these  programs  in Sub-Saharan  restore  economic  growth  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
Africa.
These findings  must be qualified:  the meth-
He shows  that adjustir  ent programs  in Sub-  odology  for classifying  countries  as adjusting  or
Saharan  Africa  had no statistically  significant  nonadjusting  does not allow  for different  degrees
effect on growth in the second  half of the 1980s,  of implementation  - so, strictly speaking,  the
compared  with the first half, but they have  had a  findings reflect  an assessment  of the effective-
significant  and deleterious  effect on investment.  ness of a proxy (adjustment  lending)  for the
adjustment  programs.
Adjustment  lending  has significantly  im-
proved export  performance  in Sub-Saharan
Africa,  at least compared  with nonadjusting
African  countries.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The average performance of the economies of SSA has worsened over the last
two decades, and by the turn of the  1980s decade economic conditions in the
continent assumed crisis proportions.  Real GDP growth rate declined  from an
annual average of 3.7% in 1970-81 to only 1.4% for 1982-85.  With the high and
steady rate of population growth in Africa, this translated  into substantial
declines in  the standard  of living  with per capita income  declining at  an average
rate  of  0.9%  in 1970-81  and  2.5%  in  the  following  period  1982-85.  Other
concomitant  aspects  of Africa's  economic  crisis  are reflected  by the  sharp
declines in foreign sector indicators.  Thus, between the above two sub-periods
the average rate of growth of exports declined from 3.6% to 1.1% per annum.
The worsening export performance is closely  related to the declining share
of  agriculture  in  the  domestic  economies  of  SSA  and  the  expansion  of  the
nontraded service sector between the two periods (see  table (1.1)).  Similarly,
the average ratio of external debt service to exports increased sharply from an
average of 9.6% in 1973-81  to average 16.7% for  the 1982-85  period (table (1.2)),
the stock of external debt to GDP ratio also rose from 39% in 1980 to 69% in
1987.  In short the story of economic performance  in Africa is summed up by
Oyejide  (1990), "There is very little debate regarding Africa's poor economic
performance  and  the  Long-term  nature  of  the  decline  in  living  standards,
particularly during the 1980s.  But controversy continues to surround the issue
of which factors are responsible for the crisis."
one important interpretation of the causes behind the diminished economic
fortunes of SSA as described above, emphasizes the role of domestic economic2
policies, especially real appreciation and real overvaluation'.  The evidence
from Sub-Saharan Africa  (see table  (1.2)) points to episodes of dramatic real
appreciation over the seventies and the first half of the eighties.  The real
appreciation is clearly related  0o  the high rate of fiscal expansion and the
increased domestic absorption  (negative of the resource balance)  where both
indicators respectively rose by 2.1 and 1.4 percentage points of GDP betwoen the
first two periods (table (1.2)).
On the face of these expansive macroeconomic policies, SSA experienced a
severe negative external shock, where the value of this aggregate shock turned
from a small but positive average of 0.1 to a negative at -5.3.  The terms of
trade component of this shock also reflect the same effect, with the TOT index
declining  from 106.3  in 1973-81 to  91.6 in 1982-85.  Also external  finance
available to SSA dropped by more than 50% over the two perious.  Therefore, as
the  RER  is  appreciated,  the  major  fundamentals  call  for  an  equilibrium
depreciation  of  the RER.  Another  evidence  in support of  this  view  is the
tremendous expansion  of parallel markets  in SSA and the rising black market
exchange  rate  premium  which  is  directly  related  to  real  overvaluation  and
economic distort  irns in general (table (1.2)).
Another possible  explanation  of  Africa's  economic  performance  emphasizes the
exogeneity  of the determinants of economic growth  in Africa, especially the
effect due to the observed sustained worsening TOT for SSA and the declining
external finance available to it.  Regardless of the extent of domestic policy
accommodation to external shocks, "The  results of  these unfavorable TOT have  been
increased indebtedness which, in its turn, has given birth to crippling debt
I  A frequently cited analysis of the economic crisis of  SSA representing
this tradition in the World Bank's Berg Report (World  Bank (1981)).3
repayments that are starving  all sectors  of the  economy of the essential imported
inputs.  Faced  with  limited  resources,  African  governments  have  redvced
investments in infrastructure and in  most cases even existing infrastructure is
in  disrepair  for  lack  of  necess..ry  inputs  for  maintenance.  This  further
contributes to the structural rigldities that blunt  supply responsiveness of
African agriculture, "Mkandawire (1989). Alao  Ndulu (1991)  found strong  evidence
in support of the exogeneity of growth thesis in the context of SSA 2.
Faced with severe macroeconomic problems such as falling export earnings,
worsening balance of payments, mounting debts, and declinin' economic growth;
many African countries undertook economic reform programs, almost all of them
assisted by  multilateral and  bilateral donors.  In  1979  the World Bank introduced
the concept  of  Structural Adjustment  Lending  (SAL) and the  closely  related
Sectoral Adjustment Lending  (SECAL) in order to help  countries experiencing
difficulties in  adapting  to external shocks,  to  phase out the initial  cost of  the
stabilization  part  of  adjustment  while  implementing  appropriate  policy  and
institutional reforms aimed  at  making  the economy  more flexible  and strengthening
its capacity  for adjusting relatively more efficiently  and easily to  future
shocks (World Bank (1985)).
2  The official African view at the time also emphasized the role of external
factors such as world recession, falling commodity price, rising interest rates
and  debt  burden,  as well  as drought,  as  the major  factors  responsible  for
Africa's economic crisis (Lagos  Plan of Action (1980), O.A.U.).4
During the 1980s, participation in the SALs programs by the countries of
SSA  has  been quite  substantial 3. The SAL8  and  SECALs  policy prescriptions
strongly  emphanize  the  adoption  of  ou-ward-oriented  development  strategy,
especially export expansion as the primary channel for eliminating the balance
of payments and debt problems.  Considerable and recurrent nominal devaluations,
macroeconomic retrenchment, and foreign  trade and institutional reforms were the
main vehicles  for eliminating real overvaluation and creating a structure of
incentives consistent with this strategy.
In addition to the controversy regarding the relative influences of the
domestic policies in the economic crisis of SSA, there has been another closely
related  debate  regarding the  3ffectiveness of  the Bank-eupported  structural
adjustment reforms.  In section 2 of this paper we will analyze in some details
the initial conditions- in terms of economic performance and policy stance- that
prevailed in the 1970-80s  this is the period that preceded the onset of the
economic crisis in the first half of the 1980s.  This second period has  been the
decision period concerning Bank-assisted structural adjustment programs by many
of the SSA member countries of the Bank.  The main objective of the analysis of
these two periods will be to address the  issues regarding the causes of the
crisis, as well as the determinants of the decision to participate in  the reform
program.
Also in  this section  we will compare  economic performance before and after
the  implementation of  the program, where  the  following  five indicators  are
3  By FY 1988, the share of SALs and the broadly similar Sectoral Adjustment
Loans (SECALs) in Bank lending was almost 25%.  Between 1979 and 1987, some 25
SSA countries received World Bank adjustment loans almost half of total SAL and
SECAL lending (Oyejide (1990),  table (2))  and  Nooter and  Stacy (1990). Also Deng
(1988), among others, contains a review of adjustment experiences in Africa in
the 1980s.5
considered: rate of growth of GDP, ratio of saving to GDP, ratio of investment
to GDP, ratio of export to GDP, and domestic inflation.  Following Corbo and
Rojas (1991),  we compare the value of the performance indicator in 1985-894  --a
period after  adjustment  was initiated--  with  performance in  1981-84--the  decision
period, for  three groups  of countries:  early intensive  adjustment lending (EIAL),
countries that have received two or more SALs or three or more adjustment loans
(SALs or SECALs), starting in 1985 or before; other adjustment lending  (OAL)
countries that started a program after 1985 or received fewer than two SALs or
fewer than three adjustment loans in 1985 or before) and no adjustment lending
(NAL), countries that have received nonadjustment loans. 5 In this paper we also
introduce a further disaggregation in this paper where we compare performance
between the above comparators within SSA and for the entire of the low income
4  1985-89 (or  1986-89) is argued to be the appropriate period to assess the
effect of structural adjustment programs on economic performance.  Examination
of performance indicators one or two years after the initiation of an adjustment
effort reveals little about  the  effectiveness of an  adjustment program, since  the
first phase of reform will be dominated by the stabilization effort needed for
establishing a credible macroeconomic environment, before structural reforms to
improve resource allocation and restore growth can be started  (see Corbo and
Rojas (1991)).
5  At the outset we are hasten to point out that while this classification
process is based on rather objective criteria and therefore avoids subjective
judgement,  it  does  not,  however,  account  for  actual  implementation  of  the
programs.  Strictly  speaking, therefore, the above classification allows for
testing  the  effectiveness of  Bank-assi-ted adjustment lending  rather than  testing
the effectiveness of the program themselves.  To be able to do this the current
classification  should be augmented with a somewhat  'subjective' but  informed
criterion specifying the degree of  program implementation.  While this should be
an important future extension to this research  (Jones (1992)), in this study,
however, we will assume that  the present 'objective'  classification criteria are
adequate  for  'approximately' assessing  the  effectiveness  of  the  adjustment
programs.6
countries  (LICs) 6.
While  the  before-and-after  analysis  of  economic  performance,  that  we intend
to  discuss  in section  2  of  this  paper,  should  be  useful  in  helping  us  understand
what actually  happened  after  implementation  of the  reform;  it is r.ot  suitable,
however,  for  addressing  the  ultimate  question  of  whether  or  not  the  Bank-assisted
reform  programs  have  had  significant  effect  on  economic  performance.  Evaluating
performance  in  adjusting  countries  requires  measuring  the  marginal  contribution
of  adjustment programs while  controlling for  other  factors that  affect
performance;  as well as explicitly  taking  account  of the potential  endogeneity
of the decision  to participate  in an adjustment  program,  since  the same non-
program  factors  that  influence  performance  in  the  pre-program  period  are likely
to  influence  the participation  decision. Drawing  from  recent  advances  in the
literature  on the effectiveness  of training  (e.g.  Heckman  and  Hotz (1989)),  we
develop  in section  3  of this  paper  a paradigm  that addressed  this 'selectivity
bias problem,  and produces  two models,  depending  on the assumption  regarding
program  participation. This allows  for  a rather  robust  identification  of the
marginal program effect on  economic performance;  and  in the  event that
predictions  of the two  models  are fundamentally  incompatible,  a formal  test  to
discriminate  between  them  is available. Section  5 concludes.
6LICs  are  normally  defined  to  be the  group  eligible  for  the  World  Bank  IDA
lending.  In addition  to these countries,  we include  six SSA middle income
countries:  Botswana,  Cameroon,  Congo,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Mauritius  and Zimbabwe  to
the  LICs group  for  the purpose  of the  analysis  of this paper.7
Table (1.1)
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE  IN SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
1970-81  1982-85  1986-89
Real growth rates
GDP  3.7  1.4  2.0
Exports  3.6  1.1  3.3
Share in GDP
Agriculture  39.3  36.7  36.3
Manufacturing  20.1  22.0  21.7
Services  37.9  41.3  41.2
Share in Labor Force
Agriculture  78.5
Manufacturing  7.8
Services  13.7  ...
Rural population  (% of total population)  79.6  74.4  71.2
Source:  World Bank Data Bank (BESD)8
Table (1.2)
SELECTED MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS  FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
INDICATOR  1973-81  1982-85  1986-89
Investment  to GDP ratio  21.5  18.7  17.1
Domestic Savings to GDP ratio  13.0  8.8  9.1
Resource Balance to GDP ratio  -8.3  -9.7  -8.0
Imports to GDP ratio  37.2  37.0  34.5
Debt Service to Exports ratio  9.6  18.4  26.4
REER (1980=100)  1/  95.5  113.5  89.4
Terv.  of Trade Index  106.3  91.6  80.8
Rate of change of CPI (inflation)  16.5  17.7  20.5
Black market exchange rate premium (%)  2/  128.9  221.9  90.9
Fiscal Deficit to GDP ratio  5.3  7.4  7.8
External Shock 3/  0.1  -5.3  -2.2
External Financing (net flows in 1980 US$mn)
Total  4/  7830  (29%)  3839  (-28%)  4635  (25%)
Public  7136  (2s%)  3357  (-30%)  4272  (31%)
Private  694  (5S%)  482  (-13%)  363  (.03%)
Notes:  I/  Index of the period average exchange rate of the currency to a weighted  geometric average of exchaAge  rates
for the currencies of selected  partner countries and adjusted  for relative price movements in national price
of the home country and its partners.  An increase in the index reflects an appreciation.
V  Includes  only Ethiopia. Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia.
3/  The total effect of extemal shocks  as % of GDP is computed  as the sum of the real interot  rate effect and
the terms of trade effect.  The interest rate effect is calculated as -(r-rbase)*(debt/GDP)beg, where r is
the real interest rate computed as (i-dplp)l(l.dp/p);  rbase is the average real interest rate of base period;
it is the ratio of interest payments  to total debt; interest payments  are calculated by adding public interest
payments to private interest paymenu; private interest payments  are proxied by multiplying  private debt
by L (L equals three-month annualized  LBOR plus one percent); the private debt is cstimated by subtracting
public and publicly guaranteed debt from total debt; dp/p is  world  inflation (proxied  by the percentage
change of the ONP deflator  of the US), and (deWODP)beg  is the ratio of debt to GDP of the year preceding
the beginning the end period. Debt data corvspond to total disbursed  guarantee: and non guiranteed debt.
The effect of terms of trade is computed as [((PX/PXbase)-1)Q(/ODP)begl-[((PMIPMbase)-l)*(M/CDP)begl, where PX
and PM ate the average export and import price indices deflated  by US ONP deflator, respectively;  PXbase and
PMbase are the average price indices  of the base period; X and M are exports of ONFS and imports of ONFS
respectively; and (XIGDP)beg  and (MIGDP)beg  are the ratios of X and M to GDP respectively  at the year preceding
the begining of the end period. All the variables are denominated  in current US dollars.
4/  The periods used are 1970-1980,  1983-1985  and 1986-1989  respectively. The figures in parentheses refer
to average annual growth rates.
Source:  World Bank (BESD),  OECD 1990  Report, Pick's Currency  Yeaebooks.9
2.  TEE DEMAND  FOR ADJUSTMENT  AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
IN  SUB-SANARAN AFRICAs  A  PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In this section we will provide a praliminary analysis of the possible
determinants of the demand for Bank-assisted adjustment.  Here we will review
initial conditions in  terms of policy stance and economic performance during the
1970s for tha three groups of comparators  (EIAL, OAL, NAL), from Sub-Saharan
African countries (SSA),  where the above  three groups were selected according to
the criteria explained in the introduction to this paper.
2.1  The Determinants of the Demand for Adiustment
The main  objective of  the analysis  of this  sub-section  is to examine
whether  or not there exits a systematic association  (and perhaps  causation)
between the initial conditions in  the 1970s and the response of the economies of
the different comparators to the massive adverse exogenous shocks of the late
1970s and early  1980s; and hence between the former and the demand for, and
implementation of, Bank-assisted economic reform on the part of the countries
with the most unsustainable initial conditions.
Initial Conditions Prior to Reform (1970-80):
Table (2.1)  provides a summary of economic conditions in the 1970. for  the
three groups of comparators.  As we stated above,  without loss  of generality, we
7  The  tables  actually  contain  the  same  comparison  for the  low  income
countries (LIC) as well.  To make the comparisons more focussed, we confine the
analysis  to the within SSA  comparisons; but all the  conclusions carry  over to the
case of LICs.10
will confine ourselves  for the remaining of this section to the analysis of
comparisons  within  SSA.  It is  clear  that EIAL  and OAL  have pursued  rnore
expansive macroeconomic policies than their NAL counterparts ,  with the fiscal
deficit  ratios  to  GDP  averaging  6.6%,  3.6%,  and  2.4%,  respectively.  Not
surprisingly the  rate of  domestic inflation  averaged 14.9%  and 14.8%  respectively
for the first two gruups, compared to 10.9% for NAL countries.  Also the first
two groups have been less conservative compared to the last one in terms of
external debt policies.  The stock of external debt as a ratio to GDP averaged
33.1% for EIAL, and 26.3% for OAL compared to 23.5% for NAL.  The debt service
ratios to export on the other hand, averaged 7.7% and 5.5% for the first and
second group and only 3.8% for the NAL countries.
The external debt story is reflected on the comparators performances in
terms of their resource balances.  Over the period under consideration, domestic
absorption ratio to GDP  (the negative of the resource balance ratio) for the
three groups averaged  10.6%, 13.6%, and 10.1%, respectively.  Also over this
initial 1970s period, the above "would  be" adjusting two groups of countries did
not adopt more export-oriented policies or achieve better  export performance
compared to the other group.  While the real exchange rate index for the three
groups ranged between 93 and 98, export  GDP ratio averaged 30.2% for  EIAL and  NAL
compared to only 21.0% for OAL.  These comparisons provide a caue against the
relatively more expansive external debt policies adopted by the EIAL and OAL in
the period prior to reform.
Perhaps the most significant aspect  of the initial conditions that set  NAL
countries from the other two groups is the record of growth and the implied
productivity of investment.  While the NAL countries  managed to achieve an  annual
average rate of growth of 6.0% over the 19709 decade, the EIAL and OAL grew by11
only 3.7% and 3.2%, respectively.  There is no significant difference among the
three  groups,  however,  in  terms  of  aggregate  investment  expenditure;  with
investment to GDP ratio averaging 24.7% in  EIAL, 20.5% in  OAL, and 21.1% in NAL.
Clearly the EIAL and OAL were substantially outperformed by NAL countries  in
terms  of real  economic growth despite  the  relatively comparable investment  ratios
across the three groups.  The EIAL and NAL countries were relatively similar
regarding aggregate domestic saving, and both of them have been more successful
than OAL on this score with the average saving ratio equal 16.1% and 12.8% for
the first two groups compared to only 6.4% for OAL countries.
The above analysis suggests  that EIAL  and  OAL countries could  have suffered
from  rather low  investment productivity  prior to reform compared to  the NAL group
of countries.  It has been argued that the rather sluggish growth in SSA despite
colossal investment, may be attributed to low level of capacity utilization as
opposed  to  capacity  growth,  driven  by  investment.  Given  the  imperfect
substitutability between imported intermediate goods and domestically produced
goods in  most of the economies of SSA,  the level  of imports could  be a reasonable
approximate measure for capacity utilization in SSA (Ndulu (1991)).  According
to table(2.2) this justification may be a valid explanation for the case of OAL
with an average import to GDP ratio at 34.7% during the 1970s, but it cannot
explain the low growth performance in the EIAL countries compared to its NAL
counterparts with the average import ratio at 40.8%  for the first group and
sufficiently close at 40.3% for the second.
Exogenoug Shocks, Policy Stance and the Adootion of Reform  (1981-84):
The above analysis shows that the group of Sub-Saharan African  countries
that undertook the Bank-assisted adjustment  have in fact  entered the 1.980a  decade12
with relatively weaker economies.  These countries did not fare  well compared to
the  NAL countries  in terms of:  (i) actual growth performance as well as the
potential  for  higher growth  in  the future;  (ii) sustainability of  external
finance and external debt strategy; and  (iii) the ability to control excess
aggregate demand and achieve internal balance.  In light of these findings, it
is natural that the massive exogenous shocks that dominated the late 1970s and
the  first half of the 1980s, have had a much more devastating impact on the
economies of the EIAL and OAL countries of SSA than those of the NAL countries.
Table (2.3) shows the magnitudes of the terms of trade, foreign interest
rate, and total  external shocks in:  1981-84  compared to 1970-80, 1985-89  compared
to 1970-80, ^nd 1985-89  compared to 1981-84.  Focusing our attention on the first
comparison for the purpose of this discussion, we note that EIAL and  NAL receive
similar and much bigger negative external shocks compared to the OAL group.  The
magnitude of the aggregate shock relative to GDP was -15.4% and -16.4% for the
first two groups, respectively; this is almost twice the total negative shock
sustained by the OAL countries.  For all of the three groups the collapse of the
terms of trade for SSA has been the factor with the most devastating effect, it
accounted for 88%  of the total shock for  the case of EiAL countries, 83% for  OAL,
and 93% for the NAL group.
Economic performance for  all  of  the three  groups is  provided in  table(2.4).
The EIAL countries of SSA experienced a dramatic decli.ae  in rcal GDP in 1981-84
where it grew by only 0.1% per year compared to an average of 3.7% achieved for
the previous period. OAL basically maintained its previous period growth level
of 3.2% per annum.  The rate of growth in the NAL countries, on the other hand,
declined to 4.5% per year over the first half of the 1980s, this is lower than
the previous period average but still high compared to the other two groups.13
Both of EIAL and NAL experienced reductions in the second period by 26% and 14%,
respectively,  in their investment ratio; and by 39% and 17% in their  saving
ratio.  The OAL countries of SSR, however, managed to achieve a slight increase
in its investment ratio by about 5% in the same period, while its saving ratio
declined by only 8%.
Furthermore,  the  NAL  countries  had  a  clear  edge  over  the  other  two
comparators over the second period in terms of domestic inflation and export
performance.  The rate of domestic inflation declined for NAL from an annual
average of 10.9% in  the first  period to a  single digit average at 8.3%, while the
export ratio increased from 30.2% to 32.9%.  The reverse happened for the EIAL
and OAL countries.  Between the two periods, inflation increased from an annual
average of 14.9% to 21.0% for  EIAL and from 14.8%  to 24.5% for  OAL.  Also exports
as a ratio to GDP, declined from 30.2% to 27.7% for the first group; and from
21.0% to 19.6% for the second.
Despite the similarity in  terms of the external shocks experienced by EIAL
and  NAL  countries  of  SSA, economic  performance  in the  last  group  has been
uniformally superior compared to  the first. Also despite receiving  twice as  much
negative external shock compared  to  OAL countries,  the NAL group has fared  better
especially in  terms  of domestic inflation  and export performance. An interesting
question to consider  is whether this happened in spite of important reform-
oriented policies on the part of EIAL and OAL countries or whether the policy
stance  taken by these countries in fact  was not significantly changed from  those
of the 1970s?  Table (2.2)  provides a summary of the evolution of policy stance
by the three groups of countries over the 1970-89 period.
According  to  the  above  table  EIAL  countries  of  SSA  have  actually
appreciated quite considerably over 1981-82 and 1983-84,  where the real  exchange14
rate index increased from  93.8 in 1970-80  to 120.3 and 126.3,  respectively.  This
leaves EIAL to be more appreciated than NAL countries which experienced a rise
in the real exchange rate from 98.0 in 1970-80 to 106.7 and 117.2 in the two
following  periods.  Given the  much weaker initial  conditions (in  1970-80) for  the
EIAL countries, and the change in the fundamentals as reflected by the sizable
adverse exogenous shocks that impacted these countries, it is clear that these
EIAL countries might  have  experienced considerable  overvaluation over  the 1981-84
period.  Therefore, the  observed decline in  exports from  EIAL countries over  this
period  is  consistent  with  the  real  exchange  rate  policy  adopted  by  these
countries over the period.  This analysis also applies to the decline of OAL
exports even though real appreciation is much smaller in this group, where the
real exchange rate appreciated by only 16% between 1970-80 and 1983-84.
In  terms of fiscal  policy, 1981-82  has been  a period of continued  expansive
macroeconomic policy on the part of all groups.  Compared to 1970-80, the fiscal
deficit GDP ratio increased by 62% in EIAL, 89% in OAL, and more than 200% in
NAL.  The fiscal expansion continues over the following period for OAL and NAL;
where between 1981-82  and 1983-84, the deficit  ratio increased by 10%  for  OAL and
48% for NAL.  The EIAL countries on the other hand managed to reduce its fiscal
deficit by an average of 32% between the two periods, this is still, however,
higher than the 6.6% ratio registered for 1970-80.
Even though the fiscal deficits in all of the three groups of countries
might not have been sufficiently brought under control over the 1981-84 period,
it appears that aggregate demand has been steadily retrenching in EIAL and NAL.
The domestic absorption ratio for  EIAL countries decreased from 10.6% in 1970-80
to 8.4% in 1981-82, and to 4.5% in 1983-84.  For the NAL the ratio it decreased
from 10.1% in 1970-80 to 8.6% in 1981-82, and it turned negative if very small15
at -0.2% in 1983-84.  Aggregate demand policy in the OAL countries, however, has
been  quite  expansive  over  the  1981-84  period  where  the  absorption  ratio
deteriorated from 13.6% in 1970-80  to an average  of 18.0%  for the 1981-84 period.
The reduction of aggregate demand in both of EIAL and NAL countries has been
partly achieved by import compression, where between 1970-80 and 1981-84, the
import ratio declined by 16% for the first group and by 8% for the second.  The
import ratio in OAL on the other hand, increased by 8% over the two periods,
reflecting the continued expansion in aggregate demand in these countries.
We emerge from the above discussion with the following broad conclusions:
(i)  the adverse exogenous shocks that impacted  most of  LDCo, and especially those
of SSA, over the first half of the 1980s, have certainly been the trigger that
pushed the economies of EIAL and OAL countries of SSA to the brink of crisis and
to the subsequent adoption of Bank-assisted type reforms;  (ii) the exogenous
shocks  by  themselves,  however,  do  not  explain  either  of  the  above  two
developments.  The interaction between  the shocks and  the initial  conditions that
prevailed  in the  19709 is key to understanding why these countries  embraced
reform; (iii)  except for  a  belated effort by  EIAL countries at controlling fiscal
expansion, others continued to produce large fiscal deficits during this first
stage  of  adjustment.  After  1983,  however,  as  external  finance  became
increasingly difficultg,  both of EIAL and  NAL countries  made considerable efforts
at reducing aggregate demand, mainly through import compression; (iv)  over this
period  the  adjusting  countries of  SSA  (EIAL and OAL)  could not  distinguish
themselves from the NAL countries in  terms of real depreciation, while the EIAL
and OAL suffered from a dramatic rise in inflation, NAL managed to reduced its
inflation to single digits.
8  See table (1.2) of the previous section.16
2.2  A Preliminary Look at Economic Performance Before and After Adiustment
An  assessment of the effectiveness of the reform program  in improving
economic performance in  the adjusting countries-especially  the EIAL  group, is  the
ultimate objective of this paper.  To address this question adequately, we need
to  estimate  the  marginal  contribution  of  the  program  for  given  initial
conditions, exogenous shocks, and the counterfactual policy stance that would
have prevailed in the absence of the program.  This will require a methodology
of analysis that allows for endogenizing the  participation decision itself.  The
endogeneity  or  the  nonrandomness  of  program  participation  is  sufficiently
justified by the analysis of the above sub-section.
This question will be addressed in sections 3 and 4 in the context of a
modified-control-group model.'  For the remaining of this section we will do
simple before and after comparisons of economic performances  for each of the
three groups of countries.  The before and after  approach gives a picture of what
has  actually happened  after the  implementation of  the program;  it does  not
however, answer the question regarding the effectiveness of programs.  The main
drawback of this approach is  that it implicitly  makes the implausible assumption
of "other things equal".  This is a nontrivial point because, for example, it is
not clear whether the change in output growth after implementing the program can
be attributed to the program or to the terms of trade or interest rate shocks.
9 The statistical model developed  in section 3 of this paper explicitly
considers two different sets of  'identification conditions' regarding program
participation  decisions and  suggests formal tests  for the validity  of these
assumptions.17
The Post-Reform Economic Performance in SSA:
To compare the performance of EIAL, OAL and NAL countries before and after
implementation of reforms, I analyze five indicators of economic performance --
real GDP growth, domestic investment to GDP ratio, saving to GDP ratio, export
to GDP  ratio, and domestic inflation --  in the three periods, 1970-80 (first),
1981-84 (second), and 1985-89 (third).
Table (2.4)  shows that real  GDP rose significantly for EIAL countries from
an annual average of 0.1% in  the second  to 3.7%  in the third, which reestablished
the average set for the first period.  OAL countries virtually maintained their
pre-program performance, where real GDP growth declined by 0.1% in the third
compared to the second and by 0.2% compared to the first.  The NAL countries on
the other hand, experienced continued economic decline where average annual real
GDP growth came down from a high of 6% in the first period to 4.5% in the second
and only 2.3% in the third.
The investment ratio declined steadily for all  countries where between
periods one and three it came down by 32% for  EIAL, by 9% for OAL, and by 18%
for NAL countries.  The saving ratio also declined by 32% and 17% for EIAL and
OAL respectively, between the two periods; the NAL countries on the other hand,
increased its saving ratio by 17% between the same periods.
Compared  to  period two,  EIAL  countries managed  to  improve  its export
performance by almost 2 percentage points of GDP and came close to the 1970-80
average ratio of 30.2%. For the other two groups, the deterioration in export
performance, however, could not be arrested; between the last two periods, the
export ratio declined by 1.1 and 2.6 percentage points of GDP for OAL and NAL,
respectively.18
Finally, with respect to domestic inflation, NAL countriec significantly
outperform both of the EIAL and OAL countries in periods two and three; the EIAL
countries, however, reduced its price inflation in the third period to levels
comparable to the first period, while OAL countries, inflation did not improve
between the last two periods.
External Shocks and Policy Stance:
In  the  previous analysis we  discussed the  magnitudes of the external shocks
for each of the three groups between periods one and two.  Compared to period
one, all three groups received negative shocks in period three, albeit with a
lesser extent than the shock of the early 1980s for  EIAL and NAL countries.  This
implies  that  external  conditions  have  been  conducive  to  improved  economic
performance over the third period in these two groups of countries.  Between the
last two periods terms of trade improved by 1.7 and staggering 6.7 percentage
points of GDP  in EIAL and NAL countries,  respectively.  These terms of trade
improvements were more  than enough to account  for the still rising  cost of
external borrowing which  increased by 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points of GDP,
respectively, for the above two groups.  The terms of trade for  OAL countries on
the  other  hand, worsened  by  2.5 percentage  points  of GDP  to  add  to  a  0.8
percentage point foreign interest cost for these countries.
In the third period the EIAL countries clearly distinguished itself from
others in SSA in terms of fiscal  policy and real depreciation. In comparison to
period  two,  the  average  annual  real  exchange  rate  in  period  three  is  30%
depreciated in EIAL countries, compared to only 13% for OAL countries and a  5S
appreciation  for NAL  countries.  NAL  countries also cut down  on  its fiscal19
deficit ratio in period three by 3.2 and 0.8 percentage points of GDP relative
to periods two and one, respectively; compared to an increase of 1.8 and 5.4
percentage points for OAL.  The fiscal deficit ratio in NAL countries was still
almost 6 percentage points of GDP higher in  period three compaeed to the first,
even though it came down by about 1.2 percentage points of GDP between the last
two periods.
To recapitulate, the following broad conclusions can be stated:  (i) the
story so far is consistent with the argument that the early phase of tne reform
program (period  two) which tends to be dominated by stabilization, is  not likely
to restore growth for EIAL and OAL countries of SSA.  Economic growth, however,
has  been restored in  EIAL countries after enough time has  elapsed (period  3), and
after  the  reforming  economies  have  adjusted  to  the  costs  of  the  initial
stabilization phase.  As we explained above the present analysis does not answer
the question regarding whether or not this can be attributed to the program
effect;  (ii) in addition to their relative success at resuming growth, EIAL
countries also improved their export performance while exports from OAL and NAL
countries continued to decline as a ratio to GDP;  (iii) it appears that the
considerable real depreciation achieved in EIAL coun..e..es  may be related to its
relatively superior export performance in the third period compared to that of
NAL countries, since both of the two groups of countries experienced positive
exogenous  shocks  of  about  the  same magnitudes;  (iv) the  steady  decline  in
investment as a ratio to GDP  in all countries is explained by the lese than
proportionate rise in private investment, as public investment declined as part
of the cut down in public expenditure necessitated by reduced external finance
for NAL and to some extent OAL countries, or by program conditionality for the
case  of EIAL  countries;  (v)  the failure  of  pr_.vate  investment  to  be forthcoming20
could be attributed to at least two reasons.  It may be because on aggregate,
public investment in SSA actually crowded in rather than crowded out private
investment, or because of credibility problems due to doubts on the part of the
private sector  regarding the adequacy  and sustainability of  reform (EIAL  and  OAL)
or the prevailing policies (NAL); (vi)  the increase in the import ratio in EIAL
in the third period whereas it declined for the other two groups, is consistent
with a relatively less binding external constraint for EIAL as reflected by the
resource  balance  indicators;  (vii) the  improved  growth  performance  in EIAL
countries despite the decline in aggregate investment, could be explained by the
enhanced capacity utilization (via  increased imports) and investment efficiency
achieved by these countries.  The reduction of investment in  this case could have
a more significant effect in terms of allowing for higher private consumption,
which should enhance the chances for sustainability of the reform; (vii) Even
though our ar.alysis  supports the concern regarding the ris:ng inflation in the
adjusting  countries  of  SSA  (Chhibber  (1991));  it  nevertheless  shows  that
countries that undertook deep reforms and stayed with it (EIAL), were able to
reduce their inflation to the pre-shock levels after the steep rise associated
with the initial cost of the stabilization part of the reforml';  (ix)  finally and
as expected, the indicators of political stability and political pluralism of
table  (2.5) show the EIAL countries to be more politically stable on average
compared to OAL  countries both in SSA and in LICs in general.  This finding
supports the view that reforms are successful, when the programs  are owned,
actively explained and campaigned for by governments that are politically stable
10  The fact that OAL countries of SSA received a large negative external
shock in the third period compared to a positive shock for the EIAL group, may
account for this difference.21
(e.g. Corbo and Fisher (1991))."
"  Actually  the  evidence  of  table  (2.5) has  not  been  discussed  above;
however, this conclusion is fairly straightforward to obtain from the table.22
Table 2.1: Initial conditions  (period average, 1970-1980)
>~~~~b-  ---  e  ''-Re  RourS:  nnua  ;  .:.  .es  loesI  isment  _
4  j  4GfP  a  f GP  of GDP
EIAL
LIC  46.5  8.7  97.9  9.0  -5.9  13.5  4.0  16.9  22.8  29.1
SSA  33.1  7.7  93.8  6.6  -10.6  14.9  3.7  16.1  24.7  30.2
OAL
LIC  39.7  6.2  98.7  9.1  -10.2  13.7  3.2  8.1  18.3  18.0
SSA  26.3  5.5  93.1  3.6  -13.6  14.8  3.2  6.4  20.5  21.0
NAL
LIC  23.8  6.7  97.5  4.6  -7.8  10.5  4.1  9.7  17.5  19.0
SSA  23.5  3.8  98.0  2.4  -10.1  10.9  6.0  12.8  21.1  30.223
Table 2.2: Selected Indicators of policy stance
Real  . O  efetieexhno  at  atooff0cldeiittDP
197Q40  1981-82  1983.44  ¶985-88  1970-80  981-8  1983-84  1A985-8a
EIAL
UC  97.9  116.5  111.5  83.5  9.0  9.8  7.4  5.7
SSA  93.8  120.3  126.3  88.5  6.6  10.7  7.3  5.8
OAL
LIC  98.7  104.3  111.7  81.2  9.1  8.8  9.8  8.2
SSA  93.1  106.8  108.8  94.4  3.6  6.8  7.5  9.0
NAL
LIC  97.5  105.6  114.5  106.4  4.6  7.7  8.5  7.7
SSA  98.0  106.7  117.2  123.7  2.4  7.5  11.1  8.2
Rat  i  of Impoon  to  GDP  -Rat-o  or resaoure  balance  to  GDP
- .--  - ¶sio  .- 1981  -82Q: 1983-84  0-8  1985-89
EIAL
UC  38.6  33.5  29.8  31.9  -5.9  -9.2  -4.1  -4.2
SSA  40.8  36.1  32.1  34.2  -10.6  -8.4  -4.5  -5.3
OAL
LIC  35.5  36.9  35.0  30.8  -10.2  -16.8  -15.2  -10.6
SSA  34.7  38.4  37.0  30.9  -13.6  -18.7  -17.5  -11.8
NAL
LIC  32.9  34.8  29.5  27.4  -7.8  -16.1  -10.0  -4.2
SSA  40.3  40.5  33.7  32.7  -10.1  -8.6  - 0.2  -2.324
Table 2.3: External Shocks
:1981-84  compared  to  1970-80  1985-89  compared  to 1970-80  1935-89  compared  to 1981-84
Terms Real  Terms,  Real  -.Terms.  Real
of  ;t  .ont.  oTotal  o  - Total  f  nt
Tradede  - - Rate  'Shock  Trade  ''Rate  Shock  Trade  Rate,  Shock
EIAL
LIC  -10.6  -2.0  -12.6  -14.0  -3.2  -17.2  1.6  -0.5  1.1
SSA  -13.6  -1.8  -15.4  -13.4  -3.4  -16.8  1.7  -0.6  1.1
OAL
LIC  -8.6  -1.6  -10.2  -9.7  -3.6  -13.3  -1.7  -0.8  -2.5
SSA  -6.9  -1.4  -8.3  -9.8  -3.2  -13.0  -2.5  -0.8  -3.3
NAL
LIC  -18.7  -0.9  -19.6  -9.5  -2.0  -11.5  3.1  -0.6  2.5
SSA  -15.3  -1.1  -16.4  -8.5  -2.3  -10.8  6.7  -0.7  6.0
Notes: The  total  effect  of  external  shocks  as  %  of  GDP  is  computed  as  the  sum  of  real  interest  rate
effect  and the  terms of  trade effect.  The interest  rate  effect  is  calculated  as -(r-
rba  s)*(debt/GDP)bg,g  where  r  is  the  real  interest  rate  computed  as  (i-dp/p)/(1+dp/p);  rba  e
is  tt.e  average  reaf  interest  rate  of  the  base  period,  it  is  the  ratio  of  interest  payments
to  total  debt;  interest  payments  are  calculated  by  adding  public  interest  payment  to  private
interest  payments;  private  interest  payments  are  proxied  by  multiplying  private  debt  by  L
(L  equals  three-month  annualized  LIBOR  plus  one  percent);  the  private  debt  is  estimated  by
subtracting  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  dett  from  total  debt-  dp/p  is  "world"  inflation
(proxied  by  the  percentage  change  of  the  GNP  deflator  of  the  USJ,  and  (debt/GDP)beg  is  the
ratio  of  debt  to  GDP  of  the  year  precedina  the  beginning  of  the  end  period.  Debt  data
correspond  to  total  disbursed  guaranteed  and  nonguaranteed  debt.
The  effect  of terms  of  trade  is  computed  as ((PX/PXbyse)-1)*(X/GDP)be  ]-[(P/PMba  e)-
1)*(M/GDP)b  a],  where  PX  and  PM  are  the  average  export  and'import  price  indices  deflatea  by
the  US  GNP  WNflator,  respectively;  PX  and  PMbase  are  the  average  price  indices  of  the
base  period;  X  and  M  are  exports  of  GNF5  and  imports  of  GNFS;  and  (X/GDP)bea  and  (M/GDP)bea
are  the  ratios  of  X  and  M  to  GDP  respectively  of  the  year  preceding  the  beginning  the  en
period.  All  the  variables  are  denominated  in  current  US  dollars.25
Table 2.4: Country  Performances
.. et  GP  -rh  :nsD  -:n  - tn ent  to GDP  :DoMestic  Savina  to GDP
.970-O  1981-8i  t  .4  .1985-8  19t.0-8  8-84.  198589  197V-0  1981-84  1985-89
IEIAL
LIC  4.0  0.1  3.7  22.8  18.4  16.2  16.9  11.8  10.2
SSA  3.7  0.1  3.7  24.7  18.4  16.9  16.1  9.9  11.0
OAL
LIC  3.2  2.1  3.2  18.3  19.3  19.7  8.1  3.3  7.7
SSA  3.2  3.1  3.0  20.6  21.6  18.7  6.4  6.9  5.3
NAL
LIC  4.1  3.1  2.2  17.5  19.1  17.7  9.7  6.0  10.2
SSA  6.0  4.5  2.3  21.1  18.2  17.3  12.8  10.6  15.0
.::SEXpors  to GDP  _  -.  Expoft Shares  tnflation
1970-80  1981-84  1985-89  1970-80  1981-84  1985-89  1970-80  1981-84  1985-89
EIAL
LIC  29.1  27.3  28.2  3.4  3.2  ..  13.5  51.6  170.4
SSA  30.2  27.7  29.6  3.5  4.0  ..  14.9  21.0  15.0
OAL
LIC  18.0  19.4  19.2  0.8  2.3  ..  13.7  22.6  23.5
SSA  21.0  19.6  18.6  0.8  0.7  ..  14.8  24.5  24.6
NAL
LIC  19.0  18.1  23.0  2.2  2.4  ..  10.5  7.7  6.7
SSA  30.2  32.9  30.3  0.9  0.7  ..  10.9  8.3  5.026
Table 2.5: INDEX OF POLITICAL PLURALISM
=  E~~.*.*..*-**.*-*.*  .'1985.8
EIAL
LIC  5.1  5.1  5.1
SSA  5.2  5.0  5.4
OAL
LIC  5.7  5.7  6.0
SSA  6.0  5.9  6.2
NAL
LIC  5.1  5.4  5.3
SSA  5.4  5.6  5.6
Notes:  The index is a simple average of two indeces on political
rights and civil liberties as reported in Gastil (1987)
The political rights index measures the extent of a fully
competitive electoral process.  The civil liberties index
measures the extent of freedom  of expression of rational
political opinion.  In each scale a rating of (1) is the
most free and (7) the least free.27
3.  ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY PERFORMANCE:
MODIFIED CONTROL-GROUP APPROACH
The  above analysis while being useful in providing a view of the  facts
regarding the differences in economic performan_;e  and related exogenous factors
and policy stance between program and non-program countries; it is not helpful,
however,  in addressing the main  question: can these differences,  if any, be
attributed to the marginal effects of the reform program.
An  adequate  framework  for  estimating  the  marginal  contribution  of  the
program  effect  should  adjust  for  initial  conditions,  changing  exogenous  non-
program factors, in addition, the methodology must explicitly consider policy
reactions and hence the endogeniety of policy instruments, and more importantly
this methodology should allow for correction of the "sample selectivity" bias
that results from the non-randomness of the decision to undertake reform.
The problem of selectivity  bias arises in  evaluating the impact  of  economic
reform on  average economic performance  (real growth,  say), when the  average
performance of the program countries would differ from that of the non-program
countries  even  in the  absence  of  program.  Formally,  if  YA  stands  for
economic performance of country i at period t in the absence of program, and if
di  is an indicator variable equal to one if i is a program country and equal to
zero otherwise; then selectivity bias implies the following:
E(Yft I dt  = 1) *  E(Yst  I di  = 0).
The  above  interpretation  of  the  selection  bias  problem  borrows  from  the28
literature on the impact of social  programs.1 2 The strand of the literature that
exploits non-experimental data (as in our case) has produced rather non-uniform
predictions regarding the effectiveness of social programs.  In a recent paper
analyzing the effectiveness of training programs, Heckman and Hotz (1989) argue
that "evidence of striking differences in estimates produced from alternative
,non-experimental  estimators  merely confirms  the  existence  of systemic  differences
between  trainees  and  comparison  group  members  in  characteristics  affecting
outcome measures", and the different non-experimental estimators make different
assumptions about the distribution of these differences.  Based on this Heckman
and Hotz  (1989) then go  on to develop  a  faraily  of models  that  resolve the
selection  bias  problem  under  varying  identification conditions.  They  also
develop formal  tests for  choosing among alternative  non-experimental estimators,
subject to data availability.
In  what follows  we  will use the  Hecknian  and Hotz (1989)  paradigm to develop
two types of estimators that permit identification of program effect under two
different  sets of  assumptions.  Our  model  also  draws  on  Rojas  and  Servin
(forthcoming) which  incorporates a policy  reaction  function  in the  standard
selection bias problem studied in the social program literature.
We start by stating the basic specification for the macro economic target
variable in equation (1)  below.
ys  =  ao + Xis 1  +  WS V2  + v, + e1,  S  K  (1A)
12  For example Heckman and Hotz (1989) and the literature cited therein.29
Yft  = ao +  X;Cal  + W;ta2  + *3di  + Vi  +  el,  t  >  IC  (1B)
where  K  is the decision period pertaining to program participations Xi,  is a
K  -element  vector  of  the  macroeconomic  policy  instruments  that  would  be
observed by country i in period t under the circumstances of non-participation
posture, WI,  is an M-element random vector of the world variables not related to
program  participation and relevant to country  i and period  t, di  is a dummy
variable that takes the value of unity if the country participates in the Bank-
supported reform and zero otherwise, the prime (')  sign  denotes the transpose of
a vector, vi  is a time invariant country specific random effect, and el,  is an iid
disturbance shock uncorrelated across time and across individual countries.
In equation (1), the target variable y,  is a function of (a)  the value of
the  selected  policy  instruments  that  would  have  occurred  assuming  non-
participation  (a counterfactual), Xi,;  (b) a change in selected world economic
conditions, Wj,;  (c) the total effects of program participation, di;  and  (d) a
range of unobservable random shocks, vi  and eft.
The policy vector  x is  generated according to the  following reaction
function:
AX 1 t  =  (YA  - t_ 1 l]  '  4  2  +  fln  +  (St  (2)
where  d  is the desired value of the matrix Yh,  of the individual economic30
indicators, Y.t,;  n l and jec  are random  effects  as in (1)  above,  following
Rojas and Serven (forthcoming),  el and  9fS  are allowed  to have a non-zero
correlation  for  i  - j  and  t  = s,  but  are  assumed  uncorrelated  in  all  other  cases,
in turn,  v 1 and  np,  can  be correlated  for  any  given  i.
This reaction function  reflects  policy  makers' responses  to perceived
disequilibria  in the target variables.  It shows that a change in policy
instruments  between  any  two  periods  is  a function  of the  difference  between  the
desired  value  of the  target  variable  in  the  current  period  and  its  actual  value
in the preceding  period,  a change in the world economic  environment,  a time
invariant  country  specific  random  shock  nf  and a disturbance  term  el..
The  vector  of the coefficients  of responsiveness  to  target  disequilibria  is 6.
One potential  limitation  of this model is that the reaction  function  can be
highly  unstable  and in the extreme  case deriving  the counterfactuals  becomes
insoluble  problem  (e.g.  Goldstein  and  Montiel  (1986)).
d Since  Yid  is unobservable,  we assume  that the desired  target  levels
depend  on last  period  policy  stance  and actual  target levels,  in addition  to
current exogenous  world environment;  this allows us to write the reaction
function  in the  following  unrestricted  reduced  form:
it  '  bo + W'  WC  bl  + X'1,c- 1 b2 +  Ye',t-l  b3 +  nf  +  eiC  (3)31
The  model is completed  by adding  a framework  descriLing  the decision  by
countries  to undertake  economic  reform.  The participation  decision  can be
specified  in terms of an index function  framework.  Let the index, IN,  be a
function  of both  observed  (Zl)--which  may include  all  of the  elements  in  Xi,  and
unobserved  (  1 )  variables  and  write:
IT  =  f(Z)  +  )
where f(.) is an unspecified  function  of Zi.  Then the il country's  program
status  is  given  by:
=11 if  and only  if  IN 1 i  >  (
z  0 othervise  5
Now  abstracting  from  (4)  and (S)  for  a  moment,  we subtract  (1A)  from  (1B)  and  use
(3)  to obtain  the following  estimating  equation  for  program  effect:
yit  - Y.,"  (wit - w 15) 'PI  +  (Xi,C-l  - Xi,0-1) 102
+  (Yi,  t-1  - Y1 ,J- 1 )  'P3 +  P 4d 1
+  (eit  - eio)  + Pr(ei  - eJ)  (6)
where  as  before  t >  K  and  s c  K  and  K  is  the decision  period  pertaining
to program  participation.
The  above  equation,  which  allows  the  elimination  of the  permanent  random32
shocks  v 1 and  nf, provides  the  structure  that  we  will  combine  with  the  Bets  of
identification  conditions  in  order  to derive  the two  estimators  of the  program
effect.  Note that since  t-l > a, the presence  of el  and  els  in (6)  implies
that  the  terms  (Yh,. 1 - Yi|)  and (X4 1.,  - X+8)  are  endogenous. This  rather  classical
source  of endogeniety  should  also  be corrected  for  along  with  the  one  caused  by
the  selection  bias  problem.
Before  we go on to discuss  individual  estimators  let  us make the  general
assumption  that  the  dependence  between  el  and  di  arises  because  of  the  dependence
between  p1  and  el,.  More formally
E(e 1 tIdj,  Xit,  Wit)  #  0  and
E(e1tId1,  X1tf  WVi, Zj)  O 0  but
E(ei'Idi,  X,t,  Wit,  Z1)  - E(e,tjXto,  Wits, Z)  (7)
This case  is  referred to  by  Heckman and  Hotz  (1989) as  "selection on
unobservables"  .13
13  Here  we don't  consider  the "selection  on observables"  case  which is  not
very  relevant  to  the  problem  at hand. See  Heckman  and  Hotz for  more  details  on
this.33
A.  First  Difference  Estimator
This estimator  is obtained  by adding  to equation  (6)  and  assumption  (7)
above  the assumption  thats  the conditional  expectation  of the difference  in a
pre- and  post-  program  set  of e11u does not  depend  on di. That is assuming  the
following  condition  holdes
E(eit - e 1 5 d1, A1  WI)  0o  (SA)
for  all  t, a,  where  t >  k  > s, and  2 1 is  an instrumented  vector  of Xh'5.
14  For
this model consistent  estimates  of the impact  of program can be obtained  by
estimating  equation  (6)  using  2SLS  or IV  methods  with di  and (Wk  - Wb)  taken  as
the  exogenous  regressors.
B.  The  Modified-Control-Grouo  Estimator
This  approach  requires  an  assumption giving  specific  functional
specification  to  the  program  status  in  equation  (4). In  addition  to  equation  (6)
and condition  (7)  assume  that:
f(Zj)  =  z1y
pj  - lid  from  the  distribution F(P1)  = PZ(pi < Pg)
14 Specification  (SA)  cen  be  motivated  in  terms  of  our  model  by  assuming  that
selection  occurs  on  the  permanent  component,  vi  of  the  composite  disturbance  term
(vi  + el)  of equation  (1)  above,  and  el  is  a  zero  non-random  component  independent
of eb  for  t >  k >  s.34
and  E(p 1jZ)  ' 0  (8B)
Now assumption  (SB)  allows  us to  writes
Pr(d.  '  l-z1)  a  E(dj1Z1 )  - 1  - F(-Ziy)  (SB')
The probability  statement  (55')  provides  a basis for  estimating  (via  a probit
model  al  Corbo  and  RoJas  (1991),  20  example)" 5 an  instrument
C  =  1 - F(-Z19) for  di. The second  step  is to estimate  equation  (6)  using
2SLS  or IV as in (A)  above but with  al  (rather  than d 1) and (wb - Wh)  taken as
exogenous  regressors.
Note that  in  case (A)  the  identification  condition  is  an assumption  about
the moments of the performance  equation's  disturbance  term.  In this case
identification  of  marginal  program  effect  is  possible  without  the  need  to  specify
the  decision  rule. On the  other  hand,  estimator  (B)  requires  specific  functional
and  distributional  specification  of the  program  participation  decision  process,
but  the  random  disturbance  shocks  to  performance  are  allowed  to be  more  general.
In the following  section  we will estimate  both models.  In my view,  these  two
estimators  should  provide  an opportunity  for assessing  the robustness  of our
results.  At any rate, in the following  section,  in addition  to testing  for
conventional  endogeniety  as suggested  by the  model,  we  will attempt  to formally
test for  the  validity  of both assumptions  using  pre-program  data.
"5  See also  Barrow  et al (1981),  and  Heckman  (1979).35
4 . BZIRICAL  RESULTS
In this section, we estimate the modified-control-group of section 3 above
and use  it to analyze the marginal effect of the reform program on economic
performance: (a)  in the EIAL countries of SSA relative to other countries of SSA
and (b) in the EIAL low income countries relative to other LICs.16 In terms of
time two possible periods can be considered: 1985-89 with 1970-80 and 1985-89
with 1981-84, in  this paper only the second will be considered.  A brief overview
of the data is provided in Appendix A below.
Estimation  of  equation  (6)  above  fails  to  produce  any  significant
coefficients for all  configurations: LIC or SSA,  TSLS or  OLS, and  with assumption
('A) or  (8B).  The  difficulty  to  find  any  meaningful  relationship  in  a
specification where all variables are in  differenced form as in (6)  above, arises
if  the  data  series  of  the  variables  involved  differ  in  terms  of  their
stationarity properties.  In this case a spe,ification that encompasses both
levels  and  differences may be  more appropriate for  the underlying  data generating
processes.
To generate such  specification we  make a slight  change  to the specification
of the  policy reaction function in (2)  by assuming  that time invariant systematic
differences among countries are fixed rather than random, and that differences
take place across regions (e.g.  Latin America (LAC),  Asia, SSA, or middle income
countries (MIC)).  Hence we replace, n 1, in (3)  by a regional dummy, REGDUM^. Now
letting t =  1985-89, and s - t - 1 - 1981-84, and using (3) (with n  replaced by
REGDUN4) in  (1A) and  (IB) as before, we  can write the  following  version of
16  EIAL country from this group is almost identical to the EIAL from SSA
since it includes only Bolivia and Pakistan as non-Sub-Saharan Africa LICs.36
equation  (6)  above:
yIt-Yls  Po  +  W'iCA1  +  (Wit-Wig)  3P2  +  X i,P3
+  yeJ 4 .+ P1 5d1 +  P6  REGDUM 1
+  (&.t-eig)  +  p76e1  (6')
In appendix  (B)  of this paper, and based on specification (6') above, I
conducted formal sequential  specification tests for  conventional endogeniety and
assumptions 8(A) and 8(B) regarding the participation decisions.  The details of
the tests are provided in the appendix.  The results of the estimation for the
chosen models are reported in tables (B.4.1.), (B.4.2) and (4.3),  while tables
(4.1) and  (4.2) contain the probit model estimation results  for LIC and SSA
respectively.
4.1  The Econometric Results
Starting with the analysis of the program participation status function
(equation (8B')),  tables  (4.1) and  (4.2) provide the corresponding maximum
likelihood probit estimates for LICs and SSA's comparisons, respectively.  The
tables also present the pseudo-R 2, defined by McFadden(1974) as a measure of the
goodness of fit of the ML probit estimation.  The decision period is 1981-84
which witnessed the first five years of intensive policy dialogue between the
Bank  and  member  countries,  regarding  Bank-supported  reform  programs,  and
subsequent  adoption  of  reform  by  these  countries.  Broadly  following  the
preliminary analysis of section 2 above, the following variables are assumed tc37
be important determinant for  a country's  decision to  participate in  an  adjustment
program in the  period 1981-84.  These variables are  the  magnitude of the external
shock in 1981-84 (period two) relative to 1970-1980  (period one), EXT21; the
index of  political pluralism at period two, POL2; the change in the ratio of
total debt to GDP between period one and two, DEBT21; the level of  inflation in
period two, INFL2; the export to GDP ratio in period two, X2; the rate of GDP
growth  in period two, GDP2;  the change  in the investment GDP  ratio between
periods one  and two, GDI21; the  change  in fiscal deficit GDP  ratio between
periods one and two, DEF21; the real effective exchange rate in period 2, REER2;
and dummy variables for Asian and Latin American countries.
The full model is estimated for the LICe comparisons; while only a small
subset of the above variables were estimated for  the SSA comparisons, given the
relatively  smaller number of  observations available  in this  case.  In both
models, all the coefficients have the appropriate signs and a large number of
them are statistically significant.  For the case  of LICsz a higher foreign debt
and inflation, a low investment ratio, and a stabla political environment, are
factors with the most significant  effect on the decision to undertake reform.
The corresponding factors for the SSA case are;  period two GDP growth, a change
in investment and in debt ratios, and political stability.  Also the estimated
participation indicators in both models, successfully predicted actual country
status, see appendix figures (B.4.1) and (B.4.2).
In the second stage the fitted value  of the dependent variable from the
maximum-likelihood probit equation  (6 3 )  is used as an instrument for di  in
performance equation (6')--except for the case of real GDP growth in LICs where38
d,  rather than  8I  was used (as  suggested  by the specification tests of appendix
B).  Because  we  are  working  with  cross  sectional  data,  the  White
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were calculated in this estimation.
The  results  of the  estimation  of equation  (6') for  LICs  and  SSA are
reported in appendlx tables (B.4.1.) and (8.4.2.), respectively.  Table (4.3)
presents the estimated marginal effects of the program for both  groups.  In
addition  to  the  above  variables  described  in  Section  2  above  as potential
candidates for the estimation of equation (6'),  we introduce an internal shock
variable  -reflecting  the  impact  of  natural  conditions  on  domestic  food
production-as a regressor (see  appendix  A for  details).  Moreover, because of  our
small  sample  size, substantially statistically  insignificant  effects in  the  panel
model  for the SSA countries, have been eliminated  from the  final regression
equation.
After  controlling  for  external  and  internal  shocks,  the  prevailing
political atmosphere, and the initial conditions and policy stance followed in
the pre-program period by each country; we find that adjustment programs do not
seem to have had a statistically significant marginal effect on the growth of
EIAL countries of SSA compared to the rest of SSA, while there is some evidence
(a 9% significance level) that it increased real growth by 1% in program LICs
relative to other nonprogram LICs.
The  estimates  of  table  (4.3)  regarding  saving,  show  a  marginally
significant and negative marginal program effect for the SSA comparison, where
adjustment programs were  estimated to have reduced saving by 8.3 percentage
points of GDP; no significant marginal program effect is found for the LICs'
case, however. In the case of investment,  the adjustment programs appear to have39
caused  a statistically  significant  drop  in  the  investment  GDP  ratio  in the  EIAL
countries  of SSA  vis-a-vis  either  of other  SSA  or the nonadjusting  LICe;  where
the  marginal  decline  was  estimated  at 8.4%  for  the  first  case  and  at  5.3%  for  the
second.
The combination  of the above result on investment  and the estimated
nonsignificant  marginal  effect  of  adjustment  on  economic  growth  (at  least  for  the
SSA  comparison);  imply that the perceived increase in the efficiency of
investment  supposed  to be generated  by the  program  has  not  been sufficient,  in
order  to counterbalance  the  ensuing  decline  in investment,  and  hence  to restore
economic  growth. Two further  implications  of  these  two findings  are  that  more
attention  should  be given  to private  sector  perception  about  the  credibility  of
reforms,  and hence  its  likely  response  to policies  designed  to eniance  private
sector  investment;  and second,  if on the aggregate,  public sector  investment
expenditure  has  in fact  crowded-in  rather  than  crowded-out  private  investment  in
SSA, adjustment  programs have to allow for increased  public investment  in
physical and human capital,  while continuing  to require the liquidation  or
curtailment  of low  efficiency  public  (and  private)  investment  programs.' 7
The estimated  marginal  effect  of the program  on export  performance  is
positive  and  highly  significant  for  the  within  SSA  comparison,  while  the  effect
is  still  positive  for  the  LICs  its  only  marginally  significant  (12%  significance
level)  ,  however. After  controlling  for  other  factors,  adjustment  program  were
estimated  to have caused  the exports  of the EIAL countries  of SSA to increase
by 8% compared  to other  SSA and  by 2.6%  compared  to nonadjusting  LICe.
The  last performance  indicator  to be considered is inflation,  which
17  The  evidence  on  the  response  of investment  to  economic  policy  is  analyzed
in Serven  and Solimano  (1991).40
according to the  results of table(4.3) did not  seem to be  significantly
influenced  by  adjustment.  Even though the estimated marginal effect of
adjustment  has  a positive  sign,  it is  highly  insignificant  for  the  case  of  LICs
and  only marginally significant (at 22%  significant  level) for  the  SSA
comparison.
Finally,  according  to tables (B.4.1.)  and (B.4.2.)  -which report the
estimates  of the full performance  model of equation  (6') above-  most of the
factors reflecting  initial  conditions,  policy stance,  external  and internal
shocks, and  political conditions;  have had  significant  effects that are
consistent  with prior expectation.  The  factor that has been consistently
significant  is the index of political stability,  where in both of the two
comparison.;  political instability  were shown to reduce  growth, investment,
saving  and  exports,  and  to increase  inflation.41
Table (4.1)
MAXIMUM LI}ELIHOOD PROBIT ESTIMATES  OF THE STATUS PARTICIPATION  EQUATION
Low income countries
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Stat  2-Tail Sig.
GDP2  -18.073  10.984  -1.645  0.109
GD121  -11.455  5.295  -2.164  0.037
POL2  -0.230  0.132  -1.736  0.091
DEBT21  3.024  1.617  1.869  0.070
EXT21  -2.111  1.719  -1.228  0.228
INFL2  2.000  1.125  1.777  0.084
X2  -2.456  2.213  -1.110  0.275
DEF21  8.235  7.604  1.083  0.286
LAC  -6.002  3.893  -1.541  6.132
ASIA  0.979  0.964  1.015  0.317
Note:  Log likelihood  =  -15.497;  pseudo R squared - 0.4842
Table (4.2)
MAXMUM LIKELIHOOD PROBIT ESTIMATES  OF THE STATUS  PARTICIPATION  EQUATION
Sub-Saharan Africa
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Stat  2-Tail Sig.
GDP2  -18.695  8.856  -2.111  0.043
GD121  -8.381  4.272  -1.962  0.059
DEBT21  2.338  1.186  1.971  0.058
REER2  0.012  0.008  1.473  0.151
POL2  -0.452  0.205  -2.202  0.035
Note:  Log likelihood =  -12.496;  pseudo R squared =  0.47
'p~~~~~~~43
Table (4.3)
MODIFIED CONTROL GROUP ESTIMATES  OF STRUCTURAL  ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
Comparing  period 3 (1985-89) to period 2 (1981-84)
. ..........  ...~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*...,.....>h,..***.......**...~
Change  in GDP growth  0.010  -0.014
(1.733)  ***  (-0.830)
Change  in ratio of exports to GDP  0.026  0.080
(1.570)  *  (2.459)  *
Change in ratio of GDI to GDP  -0.053  -0.084
(-1.906) **  (-2.314)  *
Change in ratio of ODS to GDP  -0.017  -0.083
(-0.691)  (-1.574)  **
Change in inflation  0.026  0.122
(0.383)  (1.244)  *
t statistics in parentheses
*  Statistically significant at the 5% level
**  Statistically significant at the 6.5  % level
*i  Statisticaly significant at the 9% level
t**""  Statistically significant at the 12% level
J**'"'  StatisticaUy  significant at the 22% level44
5. CONCLUSIONS
The  main conclusion of  the preliminary  analysis of this  paper regarding the
causes of the economic crisis that swept Sub-Saharan Africa over the 1980s, is
that  the  adverse  exogenous  shocks  that  impacted  the  continent-  and  other
developing countries-over the first half of the 1980s, have certainly been the
trigger that pushed these economies to  the brink of crisis and to the subsequent
adoption of the Bank- assisted type reforms; the exogenous shocks, however, do
not by themselves, explain either the economic decline or the adoption of reform
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Our analysis shows  that the group of Sub-Saharan African
countries that undertook the Bank-supported adjustment have in fact entered the
1980s decade with relatively weaker economies; hence, it is natural, therefore,
that  the  exogenous  shocks  have  had  a  much more  devastating  impact  on  the
economies of the EIAL and OAL countries of SSA than their NAL  counterparts.  The
interaction  between the  external shocks  and  the initial  conditions that  prevailed
in the 1970s is key to understanding why both of the two developments happened
for certain countries and not others.
The other question addressed in this paper is the effectiveness of Bank-
supported reform programs  in improving economic performance  in the adjusting
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa relative to others.  We motivated the analysis
of this problem by performing simple before and after comparisons of economic
performances for each of the three groups of countries considered (EIAL,  OAL and
NAL).  The  before  and  after approach gives  a picture  of what  has  actually
happened after the implementation of the program; it does not, however, answer
the question regarding the effectiveness of programs.  To address this question
satisfactorily, we need to estimate the marginal contribution of the program for
given initial  conditions, exogenous shocks, and the  counterfactual policy stance45
that would have prevailed in the absence of the program.  This will require a
methodology that allows for endogenizing the participation decision itself.  But
also the  validity  of the maintained  identification conditions  regarding the
participation decisions must be addressed as well.  An appropriate methodology
to address the above concerns was developed and implemented in sections 3 and 4
of this paper.
The results  of our modified-control-group  estimation  on the  impact of
adjustment on the economic performance  of the  EIAL countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa  relative  to  others,  suggest  that  adjustment  programs  have  had  a
statistically significant and positive effect on export performance,  and that
they have also caused statistically significant drop in aggregate investment.
These results corroborate the findings  obtained for  Bank-wide adjustment lending
by Corbo and Rojas(1991).1 8 Also according to our results, there is only weak
evidence of a statistically significant  effect of adjustment on  GDP growth.  This
result is at variance with the strong evidence in support of a positive effect
for Bank-wide adjustment programs on GDP growth (e.g. Corbo and Rojas(1991)).' 9
The  combination  of  the  estimated  nonsignificant  marginal  effect  of
adjustment on economic growth, and its negative and significant influence on
investment,  obtained for  Sub-Saharan  Africa's experience  with  adjustment lending;
18  Conway  (1990) - who applied a different statistical methodology on 76
developing countries, arrived at  broadly similar  conclusions to that  of Corbo and
Rojas (1991). Using a similar statistical  methodology to ours though a  different
base period, the Third Report on Adjustment Lending  (RAL III, 1992), however,
concludes that adjustment has restored growth in SSA to the moderate levels of
the 1970s.  Still, the majority view in  the international development community,
including the Bank, is that there is much to be desired in terms of restoring
growth and social welfare to Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Summers (1992)).
1'  Faini et al (1990), who estimated a modified-control-group model using
cross sectional data from 93 developing countries; found similar evidence to
ours, however, regarding the effect of adjustment on economic growth.46
imply that the perceived increase in the efficLcn,y of investment -supposed to
be  generated  by  the  reform  programs-  has not  .jen  sufficient,  in order  to
counterbalance the ensuing decline in investment, and hence to restore economic
growth.  Finally our results show that domestic inflation in EIAL countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa is not significantly different from other comparators; since
nonprogram  countries  in the modified-control  group  analysis  include CAL  in
addition to NAL, the above result should not minimize the concern regarding the
rising inflation in the adjusting countries (EIAL  and OAL) of Sub-Saharan Africa
e.g. Chhibber (1991)).
The results of this study are somewhat encouraging in that the marginal
contribution of  Bank-supported adjustment  programs  to  export performance has  been
positive and  significant,  given  the  potentially important  positive inter-linkages
between export growth and overall economic growth.0  On the other hand, the
findings  that  adjustment  programs  have  not  significantly  affected  overall
economic growth in SSA and have had a deleterious effect on investment, lend
credence to those who call  for more  explicit considerations of the peculiar
initial conditions of the economies of SSA in the design, emphasis and time
horizon of the  adjustment programs recommended for  SSA (e.g.  Helleiner on. cit.).
In order  to  facilitate  the  process  of  smooth  and  efficient  allocation  of
X  Though  there is  growing  evidence of  a stable  positive relationship between
openniss  (or even  exports growth  --  an indicator  of  'revealed' policy)  and
overall  economic  growth  for  developing  countries  as  a  group,  there  is
considerable skepticism about the strength of this relationship for SSA (see  for
example the survey paper by Helleiner (1991)).  More recently, however, Matin
(1992) finds  strong and  robust evidence  on  a positive  relationship  between
economic performance  and openness  in SSA.  He explains his findings by that
unlike the previous cross-section estimation with period average data, his panel
data analysis  using a fixed  effect  model avoids  obscuring the significant changes
in openneas that have occurred over the last  decade in  SSA.  Moreover, he argued
that  the  cross-section  estimation  fails to  control  for unobserved  country-
specific differences that can bias the coefficients' estimates.47
resources,  a redefined  but important  role for  governments  in reforming  African
economies is in order.  While fiscal and monetary retrenchment  are still
indispensable for  the  success of  reforms,  more  public  investment on
infrastructure,  human capital and  agricultural  technology is particularly
critical  for  generating  supply  response  in  SSA. Furthermore,  efforts  need  to  bb
made to raise  the  credibility  (to  the  private  sector)  of policy  reforms  and  to
enhance  the  degree  of  program  implementation.  Also,  our  results  clearly  show  the
critical role  (of the  politically-sensitive  issue) of  "governance" 2'  and
political  stability  in  influencing  adoption,  implementation,  sustainability  and
credibility  of adjustment  programs.
21 A  broad  definition  of  the  term "governance"  is  given  by Landell-Mille  and
Serageldin  (1991)  as "the  use  of  political  authority  and  exercise  of  control  over
a  society and  the  management of  its  resources for  social and  economic
development".  Also  see  the  above  reference  on  further  elaboration  on  the  meaning
of governance,  characteristics  of good governance  and  means  of fostering  good
governance,  among  other  issues.48
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APPENDIX  A
A.1  Some Definitions
All the data used in the analysis are taken from the World Bank's ANDREX
data base except the real effective exchange rate, which is from IMF statistics.
The sample consists of 45 low income countries, listed in Table  (A.1).  The
sample period is 1970-89.
The  variables  are defined  for three periods:  1970-80  (first), 1981-84
(second),  1985-89 (third). The number following  the variable is the  period, i.e.
GDP2  is  the rate of GDP  growth in period 2.  Variables with a number 21 mean
period 2 relative to period 1 and with number 32,  period 3 relative to period 2.
Following is a description of the variables
Five indicators
GDP  Rate of GDP growth
GDI  Gross investment to GDP ratio
GDS  Gross domestic savings tc GDP ratio
X  Export to GDP ratio
INFL  CPI inflation
Others
INT  Internal ShockP
EXT  External Shock (positive)
CAB  Current Account Balance to GDP ratio
DEBT  Total debt to GDP ratio
REER  Real effective exchange rate
TOT  Terms of trade index
DumMV variables
AFR  1 if a country is African, 0 otherwise
LAC  1  if a country is Latin American, 0 otherwise
ASIA  1 if a country is Asian, 0 otherwise
MIC  1 if a country is middle-income, 0 otherwise
PROG  1 for EIAL (program countries), 0 otherwise
>  Internal Shock was constructed by regressing cereal yield on a  time trend
and multiplying  the  excess  of  actual  over predicted  yield  by  the  share of
agriculture in GDP.51
A.2  Overview of the Data
The data used in the analysis is taken from the World Bank's ANDREX data
base, except the real effective exchange rate  which comes from IMF  calculations.
The sample contains observations from 45 low income countries during the sample
period  1970-89; the  period  for which  data  are  available  for  all  relevant
macroeconomic variables.  Only constant and price series were used.  Most EIAL
countries carried out a real depreciation in 1985-89, thus, the relative price
of investment goods and exports rose relative to the early 1980e.  Therefore, to
measure the contribution of growth  in the supply response of exports,  it is
better to work with  GDP  and export  to GDP  ratios  in constant prices.  For
completeness and to satisfy the adding up condition, savings ratios at constant
prices  were  also  used.  In the  analysis, two  _ategories  of  countries were
defined:  EIAL,  program  countries  and  a  "control"  group,  the  non-program
countries, consisting of OALs and NALs.  The OALs are considered non-program
countries  because  they  received too  few  adjustment loans during  the  period
analyzed.
The sample period was divided into  three periods: 1970-80 (first),  1981-84
(second) and 1985-89 (third), with the latter corresponding to the adjustment
period.  A comparison was made of the  program countries'  performance in  the third
period with respect to some counterfactual scenario of what would have happened
in  the absence of an adjustment program.  Simple period averages of the following
five indicators were used: rate of GDP growth, inflation  and the ratios of gross
domestic savings, gross investment and exports to GDP.  Thus, for each country
J, there is an observation for variable i in periods one, two and three.  (A
complete list of the variables used in  the analysis is presented in  Appendix A).52
Table (A.1)
COUNTRY  CLASSIFICATION
I.  EIAL (Early Intensive-Adjustment-Lending  Countries) (14)
Bolivia  Mauritius






II.  OAL (Other Adjustment-Lending Countries)  (16)
Bangladesh  Guyana
Burkina Faso  Mali
Burundi  Niger
Central African Republic  Sierra Leone
China, People's Republic of  Somalia
Congo, People's Republic of  Sudan
Guinea  Zaire
Guinea-Bissau  Zimbabwe




Ethiopia  Sri Lanka
Haiti  Yemen Arab Rep.
India
Notes:
EIAL are countries that have received 2 SALs or 3 adjustment
Operation or more, with the first adjustment  operation in 1985
or before.
OAL are other countries receiving adjustment  lending.
NAL are countries that did not receive AL In the period 1980 to 1988.
The sample Includes  Sub-Saharan African countries and other Low  income
countries. The control group in the Modified-Control-Group method
includes EIAL countries.Table (A.2)
INDICATORS  OF PERFORMANCE:  EIAL COUNTRIES
GDPI  GDP2  GDP3  GDII  GD12  GD13  GDSI  GDS2  GDS3  Xl  X2  X3  INFLI  INFL2  INFL3
Bolivia  0.042  -0.026  0.009  0.219  0.096  0.056  0.206  0.124  0.016  0.291  0.209  0.263  0.233  4.255  24.141
Cote  D'lvoire  0.060  -0.002  0.009 *  0.200  0.164  0.096  0.217  0.161  0.145  0.350  0.356  0.312  0.122  0.066  0.035
Ghana  0.005  -0.016  0.055  0.072  0.048  0.065  0.071  0.042  0.058  0.132  0.073  0.084  0.435  0.753  0.263
Kenya  0.082  0.021  0.056  0.303  0.209  0.197  0.258  0.189  0.176  0.368  0.256  0.255  0.121  0.135  0.081
Madagascar  0.011  -0.022  0.026  0.126  0.101  0.108  0.008  0.000  0.012  0.130  0.099  0.100  0.094  0.229  0.152
Mauritania  0.016  0.004  0.038  0.282  0.375  0.256  0.078  -0.012  0.152  0.372 % 0.469  0.526  0.096  0.099  0.126
Mauritius  0.056  0.040  0.077  0.297  0.208  0.321  0.295  0.197  0.375  0.527  0.470  0.590  0.150  0.097  0.061
Malawi  0.062  0.016  0.028  0.321  0.193  0.137  0.168  0.148  0.081  0.230  0.208  0.227  0.095  0.138  0.192
Nigeria  0.044  -0.047  0.032  0.194  0.159  0.083  0.207  0.119  0.090  0.223  0.112  0.125  0.153  0.228  0.200
Pakistan  0.047  0.066  0.064  0.190  0.190  0.185  0.096  0.147  0.184  0.129  0.132  0.144  0.124  0.076  0.061
Senegal  0.019  0.032  0.032  0.181  0.150  0.154  -0.286  -0.082  -0.169  0.293  0.328  0.353  0.104  0.117  0.027
Togo  0.044  -0.017  0.033  0.340  0.248  0.227  0.328  0.201  0.121  0.413  0.453  0.475  0.103  0.092  0.003
Tanzania  0.034  0.006  0.038  0.241  0.208  0.211  0.146  0.110  0.085  0.122  0.131  0.101  0.142  0.292  0.319
Zambia  0.015  0.002  0.023  0.411  0.149  0.145  0.447  0.113  0.136  0.466  0.367  0.356  0.112  0.165  0.469
en  Notes:  GDP_ : rate of growth of GDP un  - g
GDI  : gross domestic investment to GDP ratio
GDS_ : Gross domestic saving to GDP ratio
X_  : Total exports  to GDP ratio
INFL_:  Inflation
The numbers after the variable mean period 1, period 2 and period 3.54
APPENDIX  B
B.1  Some  Specification  Tests
Specification  (6')  of section  4 above  suggests  that the right  hand side
variables Yi may be endogenous.  I test for this source of conventional
endogeniety  under  each  of assumptions  (BA)  and (8B)t  and for  both LIC  and  SSA,
using  a large  sample  Hausman  (1978)  type specification  test.  (See  also  White
(1982)).24  Table (B.4.3.)  of the appendix  contains  the results  of the test.
Based on the tests for conventional  endogeniety,  I test next for the
validity  of  assumptions  (SA)  and  (8B). The  test  is  simply  obtained  by  estimating
equation (6')  for  the periods  in the pre-reform  period  of 1970-80,  where  the
'would  be' EIAL  countries  were  taken  as  program  countries. A valid  assumption
should produce insianificant  marginal  progran.  effects.  The results  of the
2  For the case  of assumption  (8B)  the instrumented  dI  (,i)  is obtained
from  estimating  a probit  model (see  section  (4.1)  above).
'  Assume  the following  linear  relationship:
(A)  Y =  ZA  + A02  +  C,  where  the  XI  variables  are  possibly  correlated  with  e
while  the  X2  are  not.  Given  the  matrix  of  instruments  Z  (which  should  include
X 2) let  *1 - PZX 1 =  Z(Z'Z)-'Z'XL  and  consider  the  following  regression:
(B)  y  Xlpl  + X2p2 +  k 1 + V.  Now a  test for Ho:  o  (a test  for the
covariation  between  XI  and  e  in  A)  is  given  by
[SSE(A)  - SSM(B)  /  SSE(B)/d.f.  I  -I,  where d.f.  is the degrees of
freedom  in  (A),  K  is  the  number  of  variables  in  XI,  and  SSE is  the  Sum of
squares  of the residuals  obtained  from OLS regression.  This test, however,
assumes  no-heteroskedasticity,  and  may  not  be  valid  in  the  event  of significant
heteroskedasticity  in  the  disturbance  term.55
estimations (not  reported here) allow us  to take assumption (8B)  as a maintained
hypothesis in all cases except for the case of real GDP growth for LICs.  The
results of the estimations for the chosen models are reported in tables (B.4.1)
and B.4.2) below.56
Table (B.4.1)
MODIFIED CONTROL-GROUP ESTIMATES OF PROGRAM EFFECTS
(constant prices)
(1985-89 relative to 1981-84)
Low income countries
a'  B>a''img  #'<'a  2'':'  ,.  .... . ............ 
~~enen&at  Variable~USL".-11at
Regressors 
0.1510  0.350  0.201
4.1390  (3.952)  (2.905)
GDP2  -0.9680  -0.628  ..  0.433  2.506
(-7.961)  (-2.605)  ..  (2.267)  (2.020)
GD12  0.1490  ..  0.161  -0.067  -0.300
4.0400  *.  (1.196)  (-1.077)  (-.800)
GDS2  ..  ..  -0.206  -0.043  -0.054
(-4.393)  (-1.428)  (-.283)
X2  -0.0890  -0.196  -0.089  0.070
(-3.680)  (-3.714)  (-1.351)  (1.475)
INFL2  ..  ..  -0.027  ..  0.298
(-2.938)  ..  (1.190)
DEF2  ..  ..  ..  ..  -2.124
(-3.555)
REER2  -0.0002  -0.001  ..  0.000  -0.004
(-1.417)  (-2.298)  ..  (1.548)  (-2.751)
TOT2  -0.0006  -0.002  -0.001
(-3.189)  (4.366)  (-2.851)
INT32  0.0080  . ..  ..  -0.113
(2.059)  ..  ..  '  (-2.996)
EXT32  0.0670  0.140  0.534
(2.234)  (1.999)  (5.365)
POL86  -0.0085  -0.011  -0.013  -0.008  0.035
(-3.772)  (-1.292)  (-1.650)  (-2.148)  (2.209)
LAC  -0.0290  ..  ..  ..  0.050
(-3.940)  ..  ..  ..  (0.374)
AFR  ..  0.028
(1.587)
MIC  ..  ..  0.028
(0.887)
PROGHAT  0.0100  -0.053  -0.017  0.026  0.075
(1.733)  *  (-1.906)  *4  (-0.691)  (1.570)  "'*  (0.805)
*  Slatisticaly  significant at the 9% level
0  Statistically significant at the 6.5% level
***  Statistically significant at the 12% level57
Table (B.4.2)
MODIFIED CONTROL-GROUP  ESTIMATES  OF PROGRAM EFFECTS
(constant  prices)
(1985-89 relative to 1981-84)
Sub-Saharan Africa
_~~~~~~~~~eedn =V'ar  ia;p.le
Change in  Chan&e  in  Chab  . .. C.a.  .. in..  .ngen..
egressors
C  0.192  0.319  0.269
(5.492)  (3.907)  (3.514)
GDP2  -1.129  -0.745  -0.742  0.745  1.732
(-9.739)  (-2.373)  (-1.402)  (2.217)  (2.299)
GDI2  0.194  -0.167  0.234  -0.066  -0.231
(3.757)  (-1.387)  (1.461)  (-0.587)  (-1.647)
GDS2  0.042  ..  -0.150  -0.071  -0.133
(2.551)  ..  (-2.293)  (-2.075)  (-2.191)
X2  -0.090  -0.118
(-2.604)  (-1.643)
INFL2  ..  -0.126  ..  -0.057  0.337
(-2.430)  ..  (-1.002)  (1.750)
DEF2  ..  -0.017
(-1.213)
REER2  -0.000  ..  ..  0.000  -0.002
(-1.420)  ..  ..  (0.866)  (-1.857)
TOT2  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000
(-3.702)  (-2.990)  (-1.828)  (0.806)
INT32  0.011  0.016  ..  ..  ,  -0.170
(1.725)  (1.009)  ..  ..  (-2.786)
EXT32  0.108  0.108  0.600  -0.115
(3.594)  (1.534)  (5.214)  (-1.495)
POL86  -0.013  -0.016  -0.030  -0.013  0.022
(-3.819)  (-1.139)  (-3.059)  (-1.910)  (1.749)
MIC  -0.019  ..  ..  ..  -0.072
(-1.482)  ..  ..  ..  (-1.353)
PROGHAT  -0.014  -0.084  -0.083  0.080  0.122
(-0.830)  (-2.314)  *  (-1.574)  **  (2.459) *  (1.244) ***
*  Statistically significant at the  5% level
**  Statistically significant at the 12% level
***  Statistically significant at the 22% level58
Table  (B.4.3)
Hausman  Specification  Test  for  Conventional  Endogeneity
LOW  INCOME  COUNTRIES
SSE(A)  SSE(B)  Number  of  (SSE(A)-SSE(B)J/
Restrictions  (K)  (SSE(B)/d.f.]
GDP  PROG  0.014203  0.007449  4  7.25
PROGHAT  0.014522  0.004744  4  16.26
GDI  PROG  0.091428  0.042994  3  9.03
PROGHAT  0.084016  0.042277  3  7.91
GDS  PROG  0.101140  0.036014  4  12.67
PROGHAT  0.102223  0.044337  4  9.12
X  PROG  0.056958  0.030937  5  5.58
PROGHAT  0.055206  0.037379  5  3.82
INFL  PROG  0.414420  0.115240  6  19.95
PROGHAT  0.426975  0.117331  6  20.64
SUB  SAHARAN  AFRICA
SSE(A)  SSE(B)  Number  of  ISSE(A)-SSE(B)]/
Restrictions  (K)  [SSE(B)/d.f.J
GDP  PROG  0.007902  0.002894  4  9.01
PROGHAT  0.008018  0.003222  4  7.42
GDI  PROG  0.061776  0.031622  4  4.69
PROGHAT  0.058446  0.020400  4  9.60
GDS  PROG  0.092260  0.026488  3  10.91
PROGHAT  0.087296  0.033600  3  7.93
X  PROG  0.039680  0.020192  3  4.89
PROGHAT  0.040204  0.018022  3  6.16
INFL  PROG  0.300759  0.113007  4  8.31
PROGHAT  0.285345  0.113976  4  7.51
_Statistically  signficant  at  1% level
**  Statistically  significant  at 2.5%  level
***  Statistically  significant  at  5% levelFig  (B.4.1.)
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